New Formalities for Casual Labor: Addressing Unintended Consequences of China\u27s Labor Contract Law by Cairns, Daniel S.S.
Washington International Law Journal 
Volume 24 Number 1 
1-1-2015 
New Formalities for Casual Labor: Addressing Unintended 
Consequences of China's Labor Contract Law 
Daniel S.S. Cairns 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Daniel S. Cairns, Comment, New Formalities for Casual Labor: Addressing Unintended Consequences of 
China's Labor Contract Law, 24 Wash. L. Rev. 219 (2015). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol24/iss1/16 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington International Law Journal by an authorized editor of UW 
Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
Compilation © 2015 Washington International Law Journal Association 
NEW FORMALITIES FOR CASUAL LABOR: 
ADDRESSING UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF 
CHINA’S LABOR CONTRACT LAW 
 
 
Daniel S. S. Cairns † 
 
 
Abstract: China’s Labor Contract Law (“LCL”) came into force on January 1, 
2008.  The first major piece of labor legislation since the 1994 Labor Law, the Labor 
Contract Law expanded legal protection for workers by mandating that labor contracts be 
in writing and delivered to all workers.  Employers, predicting that the law would 
effectively raise the cost of employing full-time, long-term workers, sought methods of 
“creative compliance” with the law.  One avenue for creative compliance emerged 
through the loophole in the LCL for so-called “dispatch workers.”  Dispatch workers are 
formally employed by third-party dispatch service agencies and thus not covered by 
employment contracts with the firms where they perform their job (“accepting entities”). 
In the first five years following the LCL’s enactment, dispatch workers grew from a 
negligible share of China’s labor force into a pervasive phenomenon.  The dispatch 
worker exception began to swallow the rule, eroding the intended labor protections of the 
LCL.  In response, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress amended 
the LCL, effective July 1, 2013.  These amendments drastically reduced the permissible 
scale and purpose of dispatch labor and augured tighter regulation for the dispatch 
industry.  Following a period of public comment, the Ministry of Human Resources and 
Social Services provided specific departmental rules regarding the licensing of dispatch 
agencies and standard industry-wide practices, effective March 1, 2014.  The new 
regulations restricted enterprises from hiring more than ten percent of their workers as 
dispatch workers and clarified the obligations of dispatching agencies as employers.  
With reports of abuse of dispatch workers continuing to surface, the effects of the 
amendments and the provisions on labor remain unclear. 
This comment addresses China’s effort to intervene in employment arrangements 
via legislation.  It first surveys the background of labor legislation in China from the Mao 
era, through reform, and into the twenty-first century.  It then examines the interaction of 
the labor market and labor legislation, as employers respond to changes in China’s labor 
regime through the introduction of Amendments to the LCL.  Finally, this comment 
suggests that reform in labor legislation based on individual contract should be secondary 
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On February 25, 2010, the National Bureau of Statistics of China 
credited the country’s “scientific approach to . . . economic and social 
development” when it boasted 8.7% real growth of GDP per capita 
following the Great Recession.1  Despite the global economic downturn at 
the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, Chinese economic 
prospects shined brightly in 2009.  Foreign commentators were quick to 
attribute this growth to the strength of the Chinese workforce, perhaps 
exemplified by Time Magazine’s nomination of “The Chinese Worker” as 
“Person of the Year” in 2009.2  Indeed, China’s “scientific approach”3 from 
the early 2000s4 and throughout the recession depended on “The Chinese 
Worker” as a cheap source of labor to maintain a competitive advantage in a 
global market.5  However, by 2010, as Chinese workers asserted demands on 
an unprecedented scale,6 the previous decade’s development model premised 
on a strong labor market weakened.7  
In what was perhaps a response to the shift in China’s economy, labor 
tensions mounted the late 2000s and early 2010s.8  A massive wave of 
strikes crested in 2010.  Since then, worker insurgency has become a 
common feature of labor politics in China, despite the government’s efforts 
to appease workers through legislation.9  Disputes about dispatch labor 
                                         
1  NAT’L BUREAU OF STAT. OF CHINA, STAT. COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
ON THE 2009 NAT’L ECON. & SOC. DEV. (Feb. 25, 2010), http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/NewsEvents/201
002/t20100226_26295.html. 
2  See e.g., Austin Ramzy, The Chinese Worker, TIME (Dec. 16, 2009), 
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1946375_1947252_1947256,00.html. 
3  Otherwise known as the “Kexue fazhan guan” (D( ,  ). [Scientific Outlook on Development].  
4   See Cheap Labour Fueling Growth, CHINA DAILY (Nov. 7, 2002), http://www.china.org.cn/english/
48127.htm. 
5  THE GLOBAL RECESSION AND CHINA'S POLITICAL ECONOMY 6 (Dali Yang ed., Palgrave Macmillan 
2012).  See generally Dali L. Yang, Economic Transformation and its Political Discontents in China: 
Authoritarianism, Unequal Growth, and the Dilemmas of Political Development, 9 ANN. REV. OF POL. SCI. 
143, 151 (2006) (“For more than a decade before 2004, wages for migrant workers toiling in factories in 
the Pearl River Delta hardly increased”). 
6  See Jonathan Watts, Strikes in China Signal End to Era of Low-Cost Labour and Cheap Exports, 
THE GUARDIAN (June 17, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jun/17/china-strikes-economy.  
7  See generally Guoguang Wu, China in 2010, 50 ASIAN SURV. 18, 18-24 (2011). 
8  See infra Part II. 
9  See generally ELI FRIEDMAN, INSURGENCY TRAP: LABOR POLITICS IN POSTSOCIALIST CHINA (2014). 
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arrangements and violations have become a common subset of the larger 
wave of insurgency.10 
The Chinese state, growing increasingly concerned about the 
economic effects of mass labor insurgency, strengthened legal protections 
for workers while simultaneously appealing to employers’ interests.  In 
China, as elsewhere, 11  labor law reforms granting legal protections to 
workers aimed to mediate industrial conflict.12  China’s signal effort to 
provide safeguards for workers in the late 2000s was the Labor Contract 
Law (“LCL”).13  Designed to increase protection for workers’ rights,14 it 
mandated labor contracts be in writing and delivered to all workers.15  Under 
Article 14 of the LCL, the worker and employer are required to enter into an 
“open-term contract”16 after either two fixed-term contracts or ten years 
together, whichever comes first.17  These open-term contracts limit at-will 
employment, preventing termination of employment absent a statutorily-
specified cause, and as such have been opposed by employers seeking labor 
flexibility.18  To gain political purchase from these employers, the LCL 
excluded employees fitting the definition of “dispatch worker” (sometimes 
                                         
10  See Investigation on the Dispatch of Labor Systems, CHINESE LABOR NEWS TRANSLATIONS (June 
30, 2011), http://www.clntranslations.org/file_download/141 (citing as example how Huangpu district court 
in Shanghai handled seventy-eight cases of dispatch labor-related disputes in 2010). 
11  See National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1935) (“Experience has proved that 
protection by law of the right of employees . . . safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or 
interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of industrial 
strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes 
arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of 
bargaining power between employers and employees”); David Walsh, To Combat the Strike Crisis, Walsh 
Urges the Wagner Bill; The Massachusetts Senator Says the Measure, While Defining Unfair Practices, 
Would Leave Employers and Employees Free, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 3, 1934), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9A01E4D91239E33ABC4B53DFB066838
F629EDE.  
12  See Virginia Harper Ho & Huang Qiaoyan, The Recursivity of Reform: China's Amended Labor 
Contract Law, 37 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 973, 987 (2014) (“[T]here are many resemblances between the 
cycles of reform experienced in the West and the ongoing reform of Chinese labor and employment law”). 
13  See generally Zhongguo Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Hetong Fa ((#<"# >) [Labor 
Contract Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., June 29, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008), translated in RONALD C. BROWN, UNDERSTANDING LABOR 
AND EMPLOYMENT LAW IN CHINA (2010) [hereinafter LCL].   
14  See id. at Art. 1. 
15  Id. at Art. 10. 
16  Id. at Art. 14 (“An open-ended labor contract is one where the employing unit and the worker have 
agreed not to stipulate a definite ending date”). 
17  Id. 
18  See Jovita Wang, Article 14 of China’s New Labor Contract Law: Using Open-Term Contracts to 
Appropriately Balance Worker Protection and Employer Flexibility, 18 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 433, 441 
(2009). 
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“agency worker”) from the open-term contract presumption. 19   Labor 
contracts exempted other parts of the casual workforce, including part-time 
employees. 
Even with the exception for part-time and dispatch workers, labor 
contract securities provided by the LCL conflict with so-called “flexible” 
employment trends and have proven unpopular with employers. 20  
Anticipating the LCL coming into effect, many large enterprises avoided 
forming open-term employment contracts by preemptively laying off staff 
members and re-hiring them under new contracts.21  The LCL also increased 
demand for dispatch workers, a section of the labor force less regulated by 
the labor laws, and hence less financially demanding.22  As employers 
circumvented the LCL in the five years following its enactment, dispatch 
workers grew from a very small percentage into almost one-fifth of the labor 
force.23  Whether the amendments and implementing regulations placed 
upon worker dispatch services are sufficient to placate labor unrest and 
appease employers demanding labor flexibility is a question that remains 
unanswered.   
This comment addresses China’s effort to intervene in employment 
arrangements via legislation.  Part II discusses the balancing act of labor 
protections and economic development.  Part III introduces the Chinese 
strategy of promoting labor rights through individualized labor contracts.  
Part IV then examines the recent history of labor contract legislation in 
China, the effect of these laws, and the scope of the new amendments and 
implementing regulations.  In Part V this comment suggests that the dispatch 
industry and flexible employment are incompatible with providing basic 
rights to workers like equal pay and workplace safety.  This comment is 
skeptical of legislative fixes for dispatch agencies premised on individual 
contract rights.  Ultimately, this comment contends that in order to protect 
China’s workers as intended under the LCL, the country would need to 
recognize collective rights at work. 
                                         
19  See LCL, supra note 13, at ch. 5, sec. 2. 
20  Dan Harris, China's New Labor Law as Plague on All Employer's Houses, CHINA L. BLOG (May 5, 
2008), http://www.chinalawblog.com/2008/05/chinas_new_labor_law_as_plague.html. 
21  See infra Part III. 
22  See Harper Ho & Huang Qiaoyan, supra note 12, at 980-81. 
23  Dexter Roberts, Why China’s Factories Are Turning to Temp Workers, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. 
(Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-03-08/why-chinas-factories-are-turning-to-
temp-workers; see generally The Dispatch Labor System in China Questioned, CHINA LABOR NEWS 
TRANSLATIONS (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.clntranslations.org/article/64/dispatch-labor-questioned.   
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II. CHINA’S INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS REGIME BALANCES DEVELOPMENTAL 
OBJECTIVES AND SOCIALIST LABOR PROTECTIONS  
 
China’s policies toward industrial relations balance two contradictory 
principles.  On the one hand there is the capitalist principle: China seeks to 
market affordable labor to employers to expand both foreign direct 
investment24 and exports.25  In this regard, China has seen fantastic results, 
especially vis-à-vis its main global economic partner, the United States.26  
On the other hand, China retains a socialist principle.  The country maintains 
a nominally socialist political-economic order, led by the working class.27  
China’s recent record on delivering the promised “workers’ state” is most 
visible in efforts to alleviate social tensions.28  
Historically, these two principles have waxed and waned with respect 
to one another.  During the Mao era, the socialist principle dominated.29  In 
1956, China virtually abolished labor contracts and brought all workers and 
enterprises under government control. 30   China guaranteed work and 
livelihood to all able workers through a system of welfare known as the 
“iron rice bowl.”31  Within this context, a system of residency registration 
(hukou) 32 established a limiting factor on public benefits.33  Hukou residence 
                                         
24  See Press Release, Ministry of Commerce, 2014 Chinese and Foreign Investment Promotion 
Agencies Conference Held in Beijing (Jan. 26, 2014), available at 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/significantnews/201402/20140200485647.shtml (“Mr. 
Wang Shouwen, Assistant Minister of Commerce of PRC said in his address that international investment 
is an important impetus to push the economic recovery. Chinese government will continue attaching great 
importance to the international investment and cooperation, further optimizing investment environment and 
improving the level of introducing FDI and going global”); see generally Elissa Braunstein & Gerald 
Epstein, Bargaining Power and Foreign Direct Investment in China: Can 1.3 Billion Consumers Tame the 
Multinationals? (Univ. Mass. Amherst Political Economy Research Institute Working Paper Series, 
Working Paper No. 45, 2002). 
25  Mary Amiti & Caroline Freund, The Anatomy of China's Export Growth, in CHINA’S GROWING 
ROLE IN WORLD TRADE 35, 36 (Robert C. Feenstra & Shang-Jin Wei eds., 2010) (“[China] is continuing to 
specialize in labor-intensive goods”). 
26  See, e.g., David H. Autor, David Dorn & Gordon H. Hanson, The China Syndrome: Local Labor 
Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 2121, 2122 (2013) (“In 
2000, the low-income-country share of US imports reached 15 percent and climbed to 28 percent by 2007, 
with China accounting for 89 percent of this growth”). 
27  XIANFA Art. 1 (2004) (China). 
28  See LIN CHUN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CHINESE SOCIALISM 129 (2006); see generally CHING 
KWAN LEE, AGAINST THE LAW: LABOR PROTESTS IN CHINA’S RUSTBELT AND SUNBELT (2007). 
29  See generally MAURICE MEISNER, MAO’S CHINA AND AFTER (1999). 
30  KE CHEN, LABOUR LAW IN CHINA 31 (2011). 
31  SAROSH KURUVILLA, CHING KWAN LEE & MARY GALLAGHER, FROM IRON RICE BOWL TO 
INFORMALIZATION: MARKETS, WORKERS, AND THE STATE IN A CHANGING CHINA 3-4 (2011). 
32  Kam Wing Chan, The Chinese Hukou System at 50, 50 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY & ECON. 197, 199-
203 (2009). 
224 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 24 NO. 1 
 
permits provided a right to social insurance, publicly subsidized healthcare, 
and education to residents of a locale where they are registered.34  These 
rights were not automatically transferrable when a worker migrated in search 
of work, even domestically.35  
Later, under the contract system re-established by Chinese politician 
Deng Xiaoping,36 hukou remained, while demand for labor depended on 
mobile capital.37  The spatial separation of work from socialist security 
under the hukou system effectuated a rapid and efficient extraction of labor 
power from Chinese workers.38  The resulting combination of policies put 
workers in a precarious position as unprotected migrants within their own 
country.  The capitalist principle resurged. 
Even in its present capitalist mode, the responsibility for safeguarding 
workers’ interests theoretically remains vested in the Chinese Communist 
Party.39  The Communist Party delegates authority among the All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions (“ACFTU”), the Ministry of Human Resources 
and Social Security (“MOHRSS”), and localities tasked with implementing 
labor laws.40  
As a state-controlled body monopolizing economic collective 
bargaining for employees,41 the ACFTU is a unique institution.  Defined by 
the Trade Union Law, the mission of the ACFTU is twofold.  First, the 
ACFTU “represent[s] the interests of the workers and staff members and 
                                                                                                                         
33  Kam Wing Chan & Li Zhang, The Hukou System and Rural-Urban Migration in China: Processes 
and Changes, 160 CHINA Q. 818, 819 (1999); see Jessica L. Montgomery, The Inheritance of Inequality: 
Hukou and Related Barriers to Compulsory Education for China's Migrant Children, 21 PAC. RIM L. & 
POL’Y J. 591 (2012). 
34  Kam Wing Chan & Li Zhang, supra note 33, at 821.  
35  Montgomery, supra note 33, at 598-99. 
36  See MEISNER, supra note 29, at 452 (discussing Deng Xiaoping, a Chinese politician who “saw the 
mechanism of the market as a means to eventual socialist ends, as the most efficient way to break down the 
stifling system of centralized state planning to speed up the development of modern productive forces, 
thereby creating the essential material foundations for a future socialist society”). 
37  Kam Wing Chan, The Household Registration System and Migrant Labor in China: Notes on a 
Debate, 36 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 357, 359 (2010). 
38  Ngai Pun & Jenny Chan, The Spatial Politics of Labor in China: Life, Labor, and a New 
Generation of Migrant Workers, 112 S. ATLANTIC Q. 179, 181 (2013) (“[T]he distinctively noncapitalist 
hukou system serves the interests of capital even better than the company towns or urban tenements in 
which Western proletarian workers were housed in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
39 XIANFA General Program (2012) (China), available at 
http://www.china.org.cn/china/18th_cpc_congress/2012-11/16/content_27138030.htm. 
40  See RONALD C. BROWN, UNDERSTANDING LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW IN CHINA 5 (2009). 
41  INT’L CONFED. OF FREE TRADE UNIONS, ANN. SURV. OF VIOLATIONS OF TRADE UNION RTS. 141, 
142 (2003). 
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safeguard[s] the legitimate rights and interests of the workers and staff 
members according to law.”42  The ACFTU’s Constitution supplies that 
“[t]he basic duty of the Chinese trade unions is to protect the legitimate 
rights and interests of workers.”43  Second, the ACFTU is to “serve as a 
bridge and link between the Party and workers and an important social pillar 
of the state power . . . .”44  In this second sense, the workers organized by the 
ACFTU become instrumental to China’s economic development agenda.45  
The general international consensus is that the ACFTU’s twofold mission is 
a contradiction;46 the union is primarily an organ of the Communist Party 
and only secondarily a representative of workers.47  
The MOHRSS 48  is a bureaucratic agency directed by the State 
Council.  The MOHRSS was formed by the 2008 National People’s 
Congress to supersede the functions of the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security and the Ministry of Personnel.49  In the wake of the economic crisis, 
the MOHRSS played an important role in navigating the introduction of 
recent monumental labor legislation, while still keeping China’s labor 
market competitive.50  
These subordinate bodies play an important role in enacting and 
enforcing labor legislation.  Each has impressed its influence on the 
development of labor dispatch legislation in China within larger transitions 
in the country’s political economy. 
                                         
42  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gonghui Fa(  <"#->)  Trade Union Law 
(promulgated by Order No. 57 of the President of the People’s Republic of China, Apr. 3, 1992, amended 
Oct. 27, 2001, effective Apr. 3, 1992),Art. 2 (China), translated in Trade Union Law of the People’s 
Republic of China, CHINA.ORG.CN, http://www.china.org.cn/english/DAT/214784.htm [hereinafter Trade 
Union Law] 
43 ALL-CHINA FED’N OF TRADE UNIONS, General Principles, CONST. OF THE CHINESE TRADE UNIONS 
(Oct. 30, 2008), available at http://www.acftu.org.cn/template/10002/file.jsp?cid=48&aid=469. 
44  Id. 
45  Id. (The working class, “represents the advanced productive forces and relations of production, 
serves as the main force in the reform and opening-up and in socialist modernization drive and is a 
powerful and concentrated social force maintaining the social stability”). 
46   Han Dongfang, Labor Law Strengthens Chinese Union, ASIA TIMES (Jan. 18, 2008), 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/JA18Cb01.html. 
47  Id. (“[I]n the majority of enterprises, ACFTU branch union officials are appointed by or in some 
other way beholden to management, they would not dare raise an effective challenge to management on 
behalf of the employees”). 
48  Also known as Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyuan (( <"## O).  
49  BROWN, supra note 13, at 13.  
50  MOHRSS To Take Measures to Help Enterprises and Stabilize Employment, CHINA CSR (Nov. 19, 
2008), www.chinacsr.com/en/2008/11/19/3657-mohrss-to-take-measures-to-help-enterprises-and-stabilize-
employment/. 
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A. Move to the Market Economy – “Reform and Opening” Led to 
Precarious Labor 
 
The Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Party Central Committee, 
held in 1978, led to the announcement of the Communist Party’s “Four 
Modernizations” policy.51   This policy is described in the “General Program” 
of the Party’s Constitution as a shift in the “focus of the work of the whole 
Party onto economic development . . . ushering in a new era of development 
in the cause of socialism . . . [and] the building of socialism with Chinese 
characteristics . . . .”52   China dissolved the guaranteed “iron rice bowl” 
social welfare policies, 53  favoring labor contracts and market-based 
development.54  In October 1992, during the Fourteenth Party Congress in 
Beijing, the arrangement was christened the “socialist market economy.”55 
The “socialist market economy” has created multiple hardships for 
Chinese workers.  Indeed, China’s economic development is predicated on 
the uneven application of labor rights 56  as part of a larger neoliberal 
institutional arrangement.57  The Deng era initiated rapid development, with 
the byproduct of creating splits among rural and urban, migrant and non-
migrant, and unionized and non-unionized workers. 58   The regional 
disparities wrought by “the new China” have prompted rural Chinese to seek 
work opportunities in cities.59  By and large, this domestic migration means 
that workers exchange safe working conditions for work opportunities.60   
Issues stemming from the disparate impacts of China’s labor law 
regime include: migration, wage theft, unsafe working conditions, a 
removed social safety net, and the externalization of the costs of social 
                                         
51  See IMMANUEL C. Y. HSÜ, THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA 803 (6th ed. 1999). 
52  THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA 7 (2001). 
53  See MAURICE MEISNER, MAO’S CHINA AND AFTER: A HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 471 
(3d ed. 1999). 
54  See generally WILLIAM HURST, THE CHINESE WORKERS AFTER SOCIALISM (2009). 
55  Tony Saich, The Fourteenth Party Congress: A Programme for Authoritarian Rule, 132 CHINA Q. 
1136, 1142 (1992). 
56  See BROWN, supra note 13, at 6 (noting that “economic development has been uneven, causing 
regional and urban/rural disparities that, in turn, have brought about an influx of millions of rural workers 
into the cities for better work opportunities, though not necessarily better working conditions”). 
57  ELI FRIEDMAN, INSURGENCY TRAP: LABOR POLITICS IN POSTSOCIALIST CHINA 15 (2014), available 
at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1096&context=books. 
58  BROWN, supra note 13, at 6. 
59  See Yaohui Zhao, Leaving the Countryside: Rural-to-Urban Migration Decisions in China, 89 AM. 
ECON. REV. 281, 281 (1999) (“The migration of rural labor to urban areas in China since the mid-1980’s 
has created the largest labor flow in world history”). 
60  See id. 
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reproduction to the countryside.61  Even in the 1960s, Chinese social welfare 
benefited industrial workers who were covered at the expense of peasants 
who were not.62  The division of workers was driven by the economics of 
development. 63   By focusing economic development on the Eastern 
seaboard—cities like Shenzhen, Shanghai, and Beijing—while 
simultaneously enforcing the hukou residency permit system, China has 
pursued an institutional arrangement that spatially separates economic 
growth and social reproduction.64  This arrangement functionally depresses 
wages,65 inhibiting worker bargaining power and providing cheap labor to 
employers.66  The process is sometimes referred to as “informalization,”67 
“work precarity,”68 or “casualization.”69 
In China, workers in the informal economy are often members of the 
migrant population known as liudong renkou (commonly translated, 
“floating population”).  The types of employment in the informal economy 
range from hired workers without formal contracts to those who are 
misclassified as informal employees, as well as to domestic workers, 
temporary workers, casual workers, community service workers, hourly 
workers without specified wages, and workers in small enterprises without 
formalized employment.70  Liudong renkou is a section of the workplace 
                                         
61  LINDA WONG, MARGINALIZATION AND SOCIAL WELFARE IN CHINA 3 (2005) (“Since the mid-1980s, 
an increasing number of peasant migrants, between 80 to 100 million, have sought work and business 
opportunities in urban areas. Nevertheless, they still carry their rural status and do not qualify for urban 
welfare”). 
62  JOYCE K. KALLGREN, Social Welfare and China’s Industrial Workers, in CHINESE COMMUNIST 
POLITICS IN ACTION 540, 542-43 (A. Doak Barnett ed., 1969). 
63 Id. at 542. 
64 Eli Friedman, Outside the New China, JACOBIN (Sept. 2013), 
http://jacobinmag.com/2013/09/outside-the-new-china/. 
65  Anita Chan, A Race to the Bottom, 46 CHINA PERSP. 41, 42 (2003). 
66  See Ching Kwan Lee & Eli Friedman, China Since Tiananmen: The Labor Movement, CORNELL U. 
(July 15, 2009), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/837 (“[China’s neoliberal regime] has created 
an influx of investment, insatiable demand for Chinese products, employment opportunities for Chinese 
workers, and room for the Chinese economy to grow by putting the squeeze on labor.  But . . . [t]he global 
financial and economic crisis is pushing the fundamental problem—the dispossession of workers as direct 
producers—to the surface, testing the limits of the Chinese approach to development”). 
67  See generally Josh Bivens, Growing "Informalization" of Employment in the Developing World, 
ECON. POLICY INST. (July 28, 2004), www.epi.org/publication/webfeatures_snapshots_07282004/. 
68  See generally Brett Neilson, Precarity as a Political Concept, or, Fordism as Exception, 25 
THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 51 (2008). 
69  See, e.g., Neil M. Coe, Jennifer Johns & Kevin Ward, Agents of Casualization? The Temporary 
Staffing Industry and Labour Market Restructuring in Australia, 9 J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 55 (2008). 
70  See Mary Gallagher, John Giles, Albert Park & Meiyan Wang, China's 2008 Labor Contract Law: 
Implementation and Implications for China's Workers 7 (The World Bank Development Research 
Group, Working Paper No. 6542, 2014), available at http://library1.nida.ac.th/worldbankf/fulltext/wps0654
2.pdf. 
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playing an increasingly large role in Chinese economic production.71  Before 
the implementation of the LCL and its Amendments, roughly 12.5% of 
peasant workers had labor contracts.72  The remainder were unprotected by 
China’s labor laws.73  Informally employed workers supplied 21% of the 
country’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth from 1991 to 1995, 52% 
from 1996 to 2000, and then 54% from 2001 to 2005.74  Overall, between 
1990 and 2004, informal employment grew by 12.5% annually.75  By 2005, 
over one-third of the overall labor force was informally employed.76  In 2007, 
the MOHRSS predicted informal employment would become the default 
form of work in the coming decades.  The extent of the informalization of 
the workforce reached such a level that, prior to the enactment of the LCL, 
the country faced a major scandal when large-scale slave labor practices 
were discovered.77   
Thus, despite tremendous economic growth and social development 
since market liberalization in 1978,78 labor standards deteriorated for a large 
portion of China’s workforce as they were forced into informal 
                                         
71   Madison Park & CY Xu, Is Migrant System China’s Apartheid?, CNN (Dec. 25, 2012), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/25/world/asia/china-migrant-family/index.html.  
72  See Li Jing, China's New Labor Contract Law and Protection of Workers, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
1083, 1094 n.38 (2008). 
73  See HAINA LU, THE RIGHT TO WORK IN CHINA: CHINESE LABOR LEGISLATION IN THE LIGHT OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 287 (2011). 
74  Ying Zhou, The State of Precarious Work in China, 57 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 354, 368 (2013) (citing 
figures from 2006 Zhongguo Feizhenggui Jiuye Fazhan Baogao: Laodongli Shichang de Zai Guancha 
( (#Q: + 	 , !S  . A6 *) [The 2006 Report on the Development of Informal 
Employment in China: A Review of the Labor Market] (Ren Yuan & Peng Xizhe eds., 2007)). 
75  Id. at 356 (citing figures from Hu Angang & Zhao Li, Woguo Zhuanxingqi Chengzhen Feizhenggui 
Jiuye yu Feizhenggui Jingji (1990-2004) (3#  $7%  Q:  + 	 
Q:    (1990-2004)) [Urban 
Informal Employment and Informal Economy in the Transitional Period in China (1990-2004)], 21(3) J. 
TSINGHUA UNIV. 111, 111-19 (2006)). 
76 Mary Gallagher, China’s Worker’s Movement & the End of the Rapid-Growth Era, 143 
DAEDALUS, J. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 81, 86 (2014). 
77 Joseph Kahn & David Barboza, China Passes a Sweeping Labor Law, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/30/business/worldbusiness/30chlabor.html (“Passage of the measure 
came shortly after officials and state media unearthed the widespread use of slave labor in as many as 8,000 
brick kilns and small coal mines in Shanxi and Henan provinces, one of the most glaring labor scandals 
since China began adopting market-style economic policies a quarter century ago.  Police have freed nearly 
600 workers, many of them children, held against their will in factories owned or operated by well-
connected businessmen and local officials”). 
78 See China’s Reforms: The Second Long March, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 11, 2008), 
http://www.economist.com/node/12758848. 
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employment.79  The legislative response to this phenomenon emerged in the 
form of the LCL. 
It is important to note that China is not unique in how it experiences 
the effects of informal labor.  The International Labour Organization 
(“ILO”) estimates that informal employment comprises the majority of all 
non-agricultural work worldwide.80  Informal work, the ILO stresses, is 
characterized by poor working conditions, poverty, and susceptibility to 
wage theft and other abuses.81  Migrant workers, women, minorities, and 
others from precarious social positions are especially vulnerable to the 
hazards of informal employment.82   
III. CHINA PROMOTED WORKERS’ RIGHTS THROUGH INDIVIDUALIZED 
LABOR CONTRACTS 
 
The LCL was designed to expand on earlier labor laws. In fact, the 
LCL was not the first gesture toward providing labor rights through 
individualized labor contracts.  In 1994, the Labor Law (Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo laodong fa) consolidated all previous labor legislation and 
promulgated a unified law of labor relations on a national level.83  The law 
guaranteed access to arbitration, litigation, and workers’ compensation.84  It 
mandated labor contracts between employers and employees.85  Under the 
Labor Law the requirements for labor contracts were similar to what would 
later be clarified in the LCL: contracts should specify the timing of the 
employment, the content of the job, pay, disciplinary policy, termination 
procedures, and the legal consequences for breach.86   
However, in the context of market reform and economic restructuring, 
workplace protections such as the Labor Law appeared inadequate. 87 
                                         
79  See Harper Ho & Huang Qiaoyan, supra note 12, at 978; see generally Albert Park & Fang Cai, 
The Informalization of the Chinese Labor Market 17-35 (Aug. 2009), 
http://ihome.ust.hk/~albertpark/papers/informalization.pdf.  
80 Informal Economy, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://ilo.org/global/topics/employment-
promotion/informal-economy/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2014). 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Harper Ho & Huang Qiaoyan, supra note 12, at 989-90. 
84 BROWN, supra note 40, at 25.  
85 Laodong Fa (  >	  [Labor Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., July 
5, 1994, effective January 1, 1995) Art. 16 (China). 
86 Id. at art. 19. 
87 See Wang, supra note 18, at 438; Lyle Morris, An Uncertain Victory for China’s Workers, YALE 
GLOBAL ONLINE (June 24, 2008), yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/uncertain-victory-china’s-workers (“The 
 
230 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 24 NO. 1 
 
Privatization, layoffs, and unequal treatment under the Labor Law created 
the floating worker population.88  Additionally, social safety nets effectively 
vanished and workplace protections went unenforced.89 
The LCL retained most of the core protections set forth in the Labor 
Law, yet it also strengthened the contractual provisions.90  Enacted in June 
2007 and entered into force on January 1, 2008,91 its stated purposes were 
“clarifying the rights and obligations of both parties of labor contracts” and 
“protecting the legitimate rights and interests of employees.”92  
In line with the stated purposes, the contents of the LCL can be 
divided into four categories.  First, the LCL contained new legislation aimed 
at protecting workers and securing their benefits.93  Second, the new law 
clarified employer obligations. 94   Third, the LCL required notice to 
individual workers of their rights and the obligations of their employers.95  
Finally, the law proposed better monitoring of labor conditions through 
empowering local labor officials.96 
The legal protections to workers were numerous.  The LCL provided 
for for-cause termination provisions in many contracts for full-time, long-
term employees.  It required severance pay for most workers covered by a 
full-time contract, set limits on overtime hours, and required employers to 
provide written contracts to all employees beginning January 1, 2008.97  The 
LCL also required permanent contracts for workers employed for a specific 
period of time, limiting the practice of temporary contracts.98  Additionally, 
the law promoted social insurance coverage for workers and ensured 
payment of overtime wages.99  Proponents of the LCL hoped that the 
increased portion of the labor force covered by contracts would tend to 
                                                                                                                         
[LCL] – brought about after a spate of headline-grabbing incidents of severe worker abuse in China – is to 
curb worker abuse”). 
88 See BROWN, supra note 40, at 6. 
89 Id. at 6-11. 
90 Wang, supra note 18, at 434. 
91 See LCL, supra note 13. 
92 Id. at Art. 1. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at Art. 8. 
96 Id. at Art. 5. 
97 Id. at Art. 10. 
98 Id. at Art. 15. 
99 See Xiaoying Li, How Does China’s New Labor Contract Law Affect Floating Workers? 3 (Nov. 
15, 2011) (unpublished article) (on file with Harvard Law School). 
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formalize the labor economy, thereby facilitating the enforcement of 
already-existing labor protections such as the Labor Law.100 
Formalizing the labor economy involved overcoming twin hurdles: 
restricting probationary periods for workers101 and curtailing frivolous firing.  
Probationary hiring was explicitly challenged by the original summary draft 
of the LCL.102  Prior to its enactment, it was estimated that less than 20% of 
workers in small- or medium-sized private sector enterprises benefited from 
labor contracts.103  Under the LCL, companies would face penalties for 
failing to provide contracts to their workers.104  Additionally, the third 
consecutive labor contract between a given employer and employee will 
necessarily be an “open term labor contract,” meaning it will contain a for-
cause provision.105  There was an observable increase in the number of 
workers benefiting from labor contracts.  From 2007 to 2008 there was a 3% 
increase in the mean percentage of workers with open-term contracts.106 
Although the majority of workers today remain employed under short-term 
contracts,107 the law increased the gross number of workers with individual 
labor contracts, along with social insurance and workers’ compensation.108 
In addition to covering more workers as a share of the total workforce, 
the LCL deepened gains for covered workers.109  Economists Fan Cui, Ying 
Ge, and Fengchun Jing found that: 
 
[L]abor law reform significantly encouraged wage and 
nonwage benefit growth.  The impact of labor law reform is 
greater for state-owned firms and collective-owned firms, for 
                                         
100 See Harper Ho & Huang Qiaoyan, supra note 12, at 975-76. 
101 See LCL, supra note 13, at art. 19-21. 
102 See Kahn & Barboza, supra note 77. 
103 See RONALD C. BROWN, EAST ASIAN LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW: INTERNATIONAL AND 
COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 481 (2012). 
104 LCL, supra note 13, at art. 82 (stating that employers who fail to conclude a written labor contract 
with an employee pay workers double wages). 
105 Id. at art. 14. 
106 Changhee Lee & Mingwei Liu, Measuring the Effects of the Collective Voice Mechanism and the 
Labour Contract Law: A Survey of Labour Relations and Human Resources Management Practices in 600 
Enterprises in China, INT’L LABOUR ORG., 37 (2012). 
107 Id. 
108  See Richard B. Freeman & Xiaoying Li, VOX, Has China’s New Labour Contract Law Worked? 
(Dec. 22, 2013), http://www.voxeu.org/article/has-china-s-new-labour-contract-law-worked.  
109 Fan Cui, Ying Ge & Fengchun Jing, The Effects of the Labor Contract Law on the Chinese Labor 
Market, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 462 (2013), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.11 
11/jels.12016/full (“Implementation of the Labor Contract Law reduced the wage elasticity of labor 
demand, especially in highly unionized and skill-intensive industries”). 
232 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 24 NO. 1 
 
large and domestic firms, and for regions with high union 
intensity and skill intensity.110 
 
An early result of the LCL was to make layoffs more costly.111  Employees 
with seniority became more protected in their jobs because the LCL requires 
open-ended contracts for employees who either receive a third temporary 
contract or who have been at a firm for more than ten years.112  In the first 
year of the LCL, this had the measurable effect of raising the mean 
percentage of employees covered by open-ended contracts.113  Additionally, 
the percentage of workers with medical coverage, age insurance, injury 
insurance (workers’ compensation), and unemployment insurance increased 
after the implementation of the LCL.114 
 
A. The LCL Opened a Loophole While Pursuing Workers’ Rights 
Through Individualized Labor Contracts 
 
The informal, non-standard workforce, including dispatch workers 
and other temporary workers in China, has grown globally.115  The so-called 
“labor dispatch” industry, which is comprised of human resources firms akin 
to temporary staffing agencies elsewhere, was one face of a national trend 
toward informal or precarious employment.116  While informal employment 
generally plagued China’s workforce, the dispatch industry, itself a subset of 
informal work, did not pose a regulatory problem until after the 
implementation of the LCL.117  This is because the LCL opened a loophole 
through which employers could pursue formalized, precarious employment. 
The Chinese government has increased regulation of dispatch labor 
because the industry circumvented formal labor relationships and 
                                         
110 Id. 
111 See Changhee Lee & Mingwei Liu, supra note 106. 
112 LCL, supra note 13, at art. 14 
113 See Changhee Lee & Mingwei Liu, supra note 106. 
114 See China's Social Security System, CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN, www.clb.org.hk/en/view-resource-
centre-content/110107 (last visited Oct. 7, 2014). 
115 See KATHERINE STONE & HARRY ARTHURS, RETHINKING WORKPLACE REGULATION 6 (2013). 
116 See Ying Zhou, supra note 74, at 356 (“[E]mployment has become more precarious across all 
sectors of the economy, characterized by the increase in the prevalence of nonstandard work arrangements 
such as temporary work, casual or seasonal work, and dispatch work”). 
117 See Li Jing, supra note 72, at 1121; An Investigation of the Dispatch Labor System, CHINA LABOR 
NEWS TRANSLATIONS (June 30, 2011), available at http://www.clntranslations.org/file_download/141; See 
Dominic Hui, Recent Trends in Employment Law in China – A Battlefield Report, 24 EMP. & INDUS. REL. L. 
14, 16 (2014). 
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undermined the stated goals of the LCL. Discussion of the dispatch labor 
industry first appeared in Chinese political discourse in 2002.118  Soon 
thereafter it attracted policy attention, beginning as early as 2005.119  It then 
received regulation in 2008.120  Because dispatch labor circumvented the 
formalization of labor relationships, there was an inherent tension between 
labor protections based on individual contract and the labor dispatch 
industry.   
In the twelve years since its emergence, the dispatch agency has come 
under increasing regulation to encourage compliance with individualized 
labor contracts.  In the five years following the regulation of the industry 
through the LCL, the government has clarified the contours of the industry 
and adopted increasingly detailed regulations.  Under the new regulations, 
dispatch employment is redefined, and three categories of nonstandard 
workers are defined: part-time workers, temporary workers, and dispatch 
workers. 
B.  Seeing the Other Side of the Financial Crisis 
 
Public comment on the LCL prior to its enactment was voluminous.121 
The American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, for example, threatened 
to lead a divestment movement if the law passed.122   The LCL came into 
force in January 2008123 as the global financial crisis known as “the Great 
Recession” affected global demand for Chinese exports,124  and was heavily 
                                         
118 Shanshan Xu, Thoughts About Further Standardizing and Developing Model of Labor Dispatch 
Market, INT’L CONFERENCE ON GLOBAL ECON., COMMERCE AND SERV. SCI. 328, 328 (2014), available at 
http://www.atlantis-press.com/php/download_paper.php?id=11001. 
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122 See Aaron Halegua, The Debate Over Raising Chinese Labor Standards Goes International, 1 
HARV. L. POL'Y. REV. (Apr. 5, 2007), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/lwp/HaleguaChineseLabor 
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123 See LCL, supra note 13. 
124 Keith Bradsher, China Reports Falling Prices and Low Demand, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/11/business/worldbusiness/11yuan.html. 
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criticized when the financial crisis hit China that same year.125  Business 
interests vociferously opposed many of the provisions, claiming that the law 
would make it difficult to maintain operations in China.126  Some argued the 
LCL made it harder for business to survive the economic downturn.127 
Others claimed the LCL fueled China’s massive strike wave in 2010.128 The 
law allegedly fed illegitimate causes of action to litigious employees129 and 
raised the price of labor.130  It even received blame for the failure of a 
number of enterprises.131 
These criticisms range in validity.  On the one hand, in some instances 
the law was opportunistically and unfairly criticized.  On the other hand, the 
law had measurably positive effects for workers,132 which may have raised 
employers’ costs.  Furthermore, the law likely provided a weapon for 
workers in the courts. 133   China’s national labor union, the ACFTU, 
expressed its public support for the law.134  However, ambiguity lingers 
regarding whether the rising costs of labor in China in 2008 were 
attributable to the financial crisis impeding demand for Chinese labor, or the 
increased cost of labor protections under the LCL.135  According to one 
estimate, the LCL directly contributed a 2-3% increase in labor costs for 
foreign enterprises.136  Others credited labor shortages and an attendant weak 
labor market for rising wages.  Whatever the reason for the rise in wages, 
some garment manufacturers, for example, relocated their operations 
                                         
125 See BROWN, supra note 13, at 39. 
126 Kahn & Barboza, supra note 77. 
127 Wang, supra note 18, at 448. 
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http://www.economist.com/node/16282233. 
129 Kevin Jones & Stan Abrams, Year Of The Rat Brings A Plague Upon Employers In China, CHINA 
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133 See Chen Hong, Maneuver on Labor Law Faces Block, CHINA DAILY (July 22, 2008), 
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elsewhere to avoid the rising cost of labor.137  In November 2008, the 
MOHRSS issued a formal request for companies to minimize layoffs.138 
Foreign demand for Chinese products declined following the financial 
crisis of 2008.139  Provincial governments attempted to keep their labor 
affordable and competitive to retain foreign capital.140  For example, in 
January 2009, the Guangdong Provincial Procuratorate issued a “Ten-point 
Opinion” related to stabilizing the economy.141  The opinion stressed that 
law enforcement should exercise caution when investigating white-collar 
crime.142  It instructed law enforcement to protect local enterprises by 
focusing prosecutions on workers who may engage in industrial action and 
slow production.143  Legal pressure on workers would discourage work-
related grievances, thereby shielding local enterprises that violated labor 
laws.  The lack of workers’ rights enforcement by localities like Guangdong 
and the efforts of employers to evade formalizing employment undermined 
the power of the LCL. 
Employers responded to the law’s economic effects in three ways.  
First, the LCL’s expansion of contract coverage and labor security for 
workers incentivized employers to try reducing workforce costs.144  For 
example, in anticipation of the LCL some companies, such as the camera 
manufacturer Olympus Optical Co., Ltd., laid off Chinese workers and 
shifted production to neighboring countries.145  Second, some employers 
sought means of “creative compliance”146 with the LCL through the use of 
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dispatch labor.147  Third, many employers simply chose to not provide labor 
contracts to workers. 
Migrant workers were especially susceptible to this third type of 
response.  One survey of forty municipalities reported that only 12.5% of 
migrant workers are covered by contract.148  By 2010 one estimate put the 
number of workers in small enterprises with labor contracts in Wuhan, 
Hubei at only 5%.149  Lack of overtime payment was (and remains) a 
common concern among workers.150  The equal pay provisions also failed to 
reach dispatch workers.151  One survey of temporary workers in Guangzhou 
showed they earned one-third of the pay of formal employees.152  Thus, 
economic pressures undermined enforcement of the LCL and the aspiration 
to provide labor rights by individual contract. 
IV. THE PROVISIONS ON DISPATCH AND PART-TIME WORKERS PROVIDED 
AVENUES FOR FLEXIBLE EMPLOYMENT OF WORKERS  
 
In an attempt to compromise between the perceived need for labor 
flexibility153 and the labor protections of the law, the 2008 LCL outlined a 
trilateral contractual relationship between workers, dispatch agencies, and 
businesses who act as customers for the dispatch agencies.154  In a dispatch 
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147  See Harper Ho & Huang Qiaoyan, supra note 12, at 981. 
148  Jenny Chan, Meaningful Progress or Illusory Reform? Analyzing China’s Labor Contract Law, 18 
NEW LAB. F. 2, 44 (2009). 
149  See BROWN, supra note 40, at 482. 
150  See Edward Wong, As China Aids Labor, Unrest Is Still Rising, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/21/world/asia/21chinalabor.html (citing a study finding 90% of surveyed 
factories underpay workers for overtime hours). 
151  China Tightens Loophole on Hiring Temporary Workers, REUTERS (Dec. 28, 2012), 
www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/28/us-china-labor-idUSBRE8BR04120121228 ("Although in theory 
contracted or dispatch workers are paid the same, with benefits supplied by the agencies who are legally 
their direct employers, in practice many contracted workers, especially in manufacturing industries and 
state-owned enterprises, do not enjoy benefits and are paid less”). 
152  Alice Yan, New Chinese Law on Protecting Casual Workers Slammed as Ineffective, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST (July 8, 2013), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1277562/new-chinese-law-
protecting-casual-workers-slammed-ineffective [hereinafter New Chinese Law on Protecting Casual 
Workers Slammed as Ineffective] 
153 Id. (quoting HR services expert explaining, “[t]he flexibility of this labour model fits the demand 
of enterprises that need workers when their business prospers, but can then just let them go when they are 
in a downturn, without any risk of labour contract disputes”). 
154 Feng Xu, Labor Law Developments in China: The Emergence of Temporary Staffing Agencies in 
China, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 431, 431 (2009). 
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labor155 arrangement, a worker signs the labor contract with the dispatch 
agency.  The dispatch agency, under separate contract with a business 
enterprise, then dispatches the worker to the business, which acts as the 
“accepting entity.” 156  The workers are therefore not employed by the host 
company, but are rather merely “leased” from the dispatch agency.157 
Labor contracts between dispatch agencies and workers must be set 
for a fixed-term of no fewer than two years.158  To be established under the 
Company Law of the People’s Republic of China,159  the dispatch agencies 
are “employers” of the workers.160  The agency assumes all liability as 
employer under the law and is obligated to provide labor contracts to the 
dispatch workers.161  
Section 2 of the LCL contains ten provisions relating to worker 
dispatch services.162  Article 57 of the pre-Amendments LCL set out a 
minimum renminbi (RMB) 500,000 registered capital requirement for all 
worker dispatch services.163  Under Article 58, a contract between the 
dispatch service provider and the worker must conform to all of the 
requirements of any other labor contract, and must additionally state the 
specifics of the dispatch arrangement.164  Article 66 of the Labor Contract 
Law provides that dispatch workers shall only be employed in “temporary,” 
“auxiliary,” or “substitute” positions.165  
Under the LCL, the accepting entity, while not formally the employer, 
has several obligations to the dispatch worker.  First, the accepting entity 
must comply with state labor standards, including safe working 
conditions.166  Additionally, part-time workers are subject to wage and hour 
regulations such as local minimum wage laws.167  The accepting entity must 
pay overtime, performance bonuses, and benefits relevant to the position,168 
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train dispatch workers, 169  and adjust wages for long-term dispatch 
workers.170  Accepting entities, additionally, are prohibited from establishing 
their own dispatch agencies171 or sub-dispatching workers to other business 
enterprises. 172   These provisions were intended to clarify the role of 
accepting entities and to minimize the differences between dispatch workers 
and other employees performing the same function in a workplace.173 
Part-time employees are the other side of the nonstandard workforce 
that grew after the implementation of the LCL.  In the original language of 
the LCL, since amended, part-time workers were defined narrowly: part-
time workers were those paid on an hourly-wage basis and could not work 
more than four hours per day or more than twenty-four hours per week.174  
Employers were not required to provide labor contracts to part-time 
employees.175  Without labor contracts, part-time employees are not granted 
several benefits otherwise granted to employees.  For example, while 
employers were required to pay severance to full-time employees, they were 
not required to do the same for part-time employees.176 
A. The LCL Itself Supplied the Formal Means through Which Employers 
Could Evade the Intent of the Law. 
 
Even though the original LCL limited the use of dispatch workers, the 
provisions of the law were ineffective.  Indeed, the use of dispatch labor 
expanded rapidly from the years 2008 to 2013.  In 2010, the ACFTU 
produced a survey suggesting there were up to sixty million dispatch 
workers in China.177  More recently, according to the China Labor Dispatch 
Industry Indepth Research and Investment Strategy Report, 2013-2017, there 
are roughly 26,000 labor dispatch companies in China, employing 
approximately twenty-seven million people.  Dispatch workers make up 
                                         
169  Id. at art. 62(4). 
170  Id. at art. 62(5). 
171  Id. at art. 67. 
172  Id. at art. 62. 
173  See Wang, supra note 18, at 439. 
174  See LCL, supra note 13, at art.  68. 
175  Id. at art. 69. 
176  Id. at art. 71. 
177  Bryan Cave, China Amends Labor Contract Law to Eliminate Labor Dispatch Abuse, BRYAN 
CAVE LLP (Apr. 18. 2013), http://www.bryancave.com/files/Publication/030e4ed6-0109-4ce8-9d0a-
4c9928c016d8/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/91bb2766-574c-417f-ad07-
4e32cd68550a/LaborAlert4-18-13.pdf.   
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roughly 5% of the total workforce.178   Some industries have a larger 
representation of dispatch workers than others.179  For example, 20% of 
Bank of China workers were dispatched.180  Some sectors of government-run 
enterprises employ a workforce comprised predominantly of dispatch 
workers.181 
There is a permissible role for labor dispatch, but labor leasing is 
often used by employers as a semi-legal shortcut to reduce labor costs.182  
One way to do this is to use dispatch labor as a method of probationary 
hiring.  In this method, the temporary dispatch is a trial for future full-time 
employees.  Employers evaluate dispatch worker productivity and screen for 
the best employees.  This process eliminates selection and error risk and 
effectively reduces personnel costs.  Reports from Chinese labor dispatch 
providers confirm this:  
 
“If a worker doesn’t obey orders, then they can just get rid of 
them,” says Zhang Zhiru, director of the Shenzhen Chunfeng 
Labor Dispute Service.  And although required to by law, labor 
dispatchers often do not provide social welfare insurance, 
which can make up as much as 40 percent of a full-fledged 
employee’s cost . . . .183  
 
The practice of employing temporary dispatch workers as a business practice 
designed to lower labor costs is so widespread, it is used by foreign 
                                         
178   China Labor Dispatch Industry Indepth Research and Investment Strategy Report, 2013-2017, 
QIANZHAN (May 6, 2014), http://en.qianzhan.com/report/detail/6cdf8ac1017640a3.html (last visited Oct. 7, 
2014). 
179  Rights of 60 Million Labor Dispatch Workers Hard to Protect, CHINA LABOR NEWS 
TRANSLATIONS (Feb. 28, 2011), http://www.clntranslations.org/file_download/140 (listing industries with 
larger representation of dispatch workers: “petroleum, chemical, telecommunications, finance, banking, 
aviation, and railways”). 
180  Jiang Jie, Equal Work Rights For Temps, GLOBAL TIMES (Aug. 9, 2013), 
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/802695.shtml. 
181  See Rights of 60 Million Labor Dispatch Workers Hard to Protect, supra note 179, at 1. 
182  See DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, NEW LABOR CONTRACT LAW AFFECTS EMPLOYMENT 
ARRANGEMENTS OF FOREIGN INVESTED ENTERPRISES IN CHINA (June 25, 2013), 
http://www.dorsey.com/eu_China_Labor_Contract_Law_062413/ (“[B]enefits of labor dispatching 
arrangements include: Savings in local HR manpower and cost because the labor dispatching agency will 
handle the payroll, social insurance, income tax return and other employment matters; Reducing the parent 
company’s cost of hiring because dispatched employees are not deemed as regular employees and therefore 
are often omitted from company’s global head count”). 
183  Roberts, supra note 23. 
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multinational companies operating in China, including Swire Beverages 
Limited.184 
Attrition dispatch, also known as “reverse dispatch” is the practice of 
transferring full-time contract employees to a dispatch service to reduce the 
number of fixed staff and enhance flexibility.185  Attrition dispatch brings 
administrative simplicity to firms: it “freed them from having to navigate the 
paperwork required by labour and tax authorities.” 186  The practice also 
saves money for firms through lower wages and social security payments.187  
Notwithstanding LCL Article 63, which provides that “workers dispatched 
shall have the right to receive the same pay as that received by employees of 
the accepting entity for the same work,”188 workers whose contracts are with 
a dispatch agency “are paid a much lower salary and enjoy fewer benefits 
than formal coworkers.”189  A story from China Labor Watch’s investigation 
into multinational electronics manufacturers illustrates the practice: 
 
At Tyco Electronics and Catcher Technology for example, 
although the factories directly employ some workers, they sign 
labor contracts with a separate labor dispatch agency.  As a 
result of this inconsistency, the factories may arbitrarily fire 
workers, providing workers with almost no job security.190 
 
The arrangement weakens worker bargaining power so much that workers 
pay a fee to the dispatch company in order to work.191  Although prohibited 
by Article 60 of the LCL,192  the practice continues and is sometimes 
                                         
184  BROWN, supra note 40, at 482. 
185  See Haiyan Wang, Richard P. Applebaum, Francesca Degiuli & Nelson Lichtenstein, China's New 
Labour Contract Law: Is China Moving Towards Increased Power For Workers?, THIRD WORLD Q. 494 
(Mar. 31, 2009); see also Chinese Students Go Undercover To Investigate Coca Cola: Students Beaten By 
Manager When He Asked For His Wages, CHINA LABOR NEWS TRANSLATIONS 2 (Sept. 16, 2009), 
http://www.clntranslations.org/file_download/86.   
186  China Hand - Labour Pains, THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT (Oct. 17, 2013), 2013 WLNR 
26138423. 
187  Id. 
188  See LCL, supra note 13, at art. 63. 
189  Jiang Jie, supra note 180. 
190  CHINA LABOR WATCH, TRAGEDIES OF GLOBALIZATION: THE TRUTH BEHIND ELECTRONICS 
SWEATSHOPS NO CONTRACTS, EXCESSIVE OVERTIME AND DISCRIMINATION: A REPORT ON ABUSES IN TEN 
MULTINATIONAL ELECTRONICS FACTORIES, 6 (2012), available at 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2104&context=globaldocs. 
191  Roberts, supra note 23.  
192  See LCL, supra note 13, at art. 60 (“No worker dispatch service provider or accepting entity may 
charge any fee from any dispatched worker.”). 
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administered discriminatorily.  A description from China Labor Watch 
describes this violation in practice: 
 
Within 100 meters from the back gate of the Tyco factory, there 
is a labor dispatch company, Huacai, which conducts 
recruitment for Tyco.  Tyco and Huacai have signed a long-
standing agreement, through which Huacai recruits workers on 
behalf of Tyco.  Workers recruited via the labor dispatch 
company sign a contract with Huacai only [not the factory].  
Wages are also distributed to workers by Huacai who use it as 
an intermediary.  The Huacai employees stressed they only 
recruited women and do not recruit male workers.  At the back 
gate of the factory, on the surrounding streets, there is a large-
scale labor market with many different companies that all 
recruit for Tyco.  Female workers seeking recruitment must pay 
$15 USD fee and male workers must pay a $30 USD fee.193 
 
Such practices exceed the permissible scope of labor dispatch under the 
LCL, but nevertheless remain common.194  The LCL provided incentives 
that led to this arrangement.  It allowed reverse dispatch, the expanded use 
of labor dispatch to avoid the rising costs of employing full-time workers 
and thereby it tacitly permitted industry to prey upon precarious workers. 
Ultimately, the LCL birthed a dispatch labor industry that undermined the 
remedial intent of the law.195 
B. China Amended and Clarified the Labor Contract Law to Address 
Excessive Use of Informal Labor 
 
In its earliest stages following the LCL, “labor dispatch” practices 
were limited.  The Regulation on the Implementation of the Labor Contract 
Law of the People's Republic of China (“Implementing Regulations”) 
applied the obligations of other employers to dispatch agencies.196  The 
                                         
193  CHINA LABOR WATCH, supra note 190. 
194  See Harper Ho & Huang Qiaoyan, supra note 12.  
195  Id. 
196  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Hetong Fa Shishi Tiaoli (( <"#   > 68
0	 [The Regulation on the Implementation of the Labor Contract Law of the People's Republic of China] 
(promulgated by Order No. 535 by the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Sept. 3, 2008, 
effective Sept. 3, 2008) Art. 29 (China), translated in http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?id=7055&lib=law& 
 
242 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 24 NO. 1 
 
implementing regulations require employers to comply with all relevant state 
and national labor laws when employing temporary workers.197  Employers 
must also provide severance pay to temporary workers.198  
However, under the early version of the LCL, there was no legal 
deterrent against using part-time temporary workers to replace full-time 
workers.199  In fact, many companies found it economically profitable to 
shift work from full-time employees, who were required to be provided with 
a labor contract, to part-time employees, who were comparatively 
cheaper.200 
Recognizing that the expansion of labor dispatch thwarts the purpose 
of the LCL201 and undermines economic stability by causing labor unrest,202 
the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress amended the 
Law in 2013 to curb the abuse of dispatch labor.203  The Eleventh National 
Congress voted to amend on December 28, 2012. 204   The resulting 
Amendments were announced by January 2013 and came into effect on July 
1, 2013.205  The Amendments addressed the largely under regulated dispatch 
worker industry and set narrow limits on dispatch employment.206  
                                                                                                                         
SearchKeyword=&SearchCKeyword=%c0%cd%b6%af%ba%cf%cd%ac%b7%a8 [hereinafter 
“Implementing Regulations”]. 
197  Id. at arts. 27-32. 
198  Id. at art. 31. 
199  See Wang, supra note 18 at 454-56. 
200  See Harper Ho & Huang Qiaoyan, supra note 12 at 977. 
201  See supra Part IV.A. 
202  See supra Part III.B. 
203  New Amendments to China Labor Contract Law to Set Restrictions on the Use of Labor Dispatch, 
FROST BROWN TODD LLC (June 26, 2013), http://isg.frostbrowntodd.com/New-Amendments-to-China-
Labor.  
204  Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Xiugai “Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Laodong Hetong Fa” De Jueding #<I&/ ' 
25( <"#   >
A)) [Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Decision Regarding Amendments to the 
Labor Contract Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Dec. 28, 2012, effective July 1, 2013), http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2012-
12/28/content_2305571.htm (China) [hereinafter Amendments].   
205  MCDERMOTT, WILL & EMERY REVISIONS TO LABOUR CONTRACT LAW ADDRESS EMPLOYEE 
DISPATCH ISSUES, COMPANY EMPLOYMENT MODELS (Jan. 19, 2013), http://www.mwe.com/Revisions-to-
Labour-Contract-Law-Address-Employee-Dispatch-Issues-Company-Employment-Models-01-17-2013/. 
206  See generally LAODONG ZHONGCAI WANG (  JF) [LABOR ARBITRATION NETWORK], 
LAODONG HETONG FA XIUZHENG AN JI LAODONG ZHENYI SIFA JIESHI SHIWU CAOZU LAODENG HETONG 
FA WANG (   >2:9  ) >K   4) [LABOR CONTRACT LAW AMENDMENT AND JUDICIAL 
INTERPRETATION OF THE PRACTICAL OPERATION OF LABOR DISPUTES] (May 20, 2013), 
http://www.ldht.org/html/peixun/3195.html. 
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The ACFTU, for its part, advocated closing the contractual 
workaround of the LCL.207  The loophole, which had not gone unnoticed by 
employers or legal analysts,208 “allowed workers to sign labour contracts 
with intermediary employment agencies rather than directly with their 
ultimate employers.” 209   The Amendments did not fix the loophole 
altogether, though they established standards for this practice.210 
The Amendments define the positions listed in LCL Art. 66.  
Temporary positions are defined to be six months or less.211  Auxiliary 
positions support and service the principal business activity but are not core 
positions.212  Dispatch workers may be employed in substitute positions 
when full-time employees are on leave or otherwise unavailable.213  The 
enterprise is required to replace full-time workers with other full-time 
workers when possible.214  The rule now clarifies that contractual (i.e. 
bilateral) employment is the default form of employment in China; dispatch 
labor may only be used to supplement, not replace, a firm’s full-time 
workforce. 
Dispatch agencies also now operate under tighter regulation.  The 
Amendments provide a minimum size for dispatch agencies.215  All dispatch 
agencies are required to have operating capital expenses over two million 
yuan; the earlier requirement was only RMB 500,000.216  This provision 
should help to clarify the difference between dispatch centers and labor 
trafficking networks.217  For example, firms now must be registered with an 
administrative labor bureau, and small or solo dispatch agencies will not be 
permitted. 218   The Amendments require that all written contracts also 
                                         
207  China Hand: Labour Pains, supra note 186. 
208  See generally CHINA LAW & PRACTICE, EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT LAW: LOOPHOLES REVEALED, 
(Mar./Apr. 2013), www.chinalawandpractice.com/Article/3148986/Search/Employment-Contract-Law-
loopholes-revealed.html. 
209  China Hand: Labour Pains, supra note 186. 
210  Id. 
211  Amendments, supra note 204, at art. 3. 
212  Id. 
213  Id. 
214  Id. 
215  See LCL, supra note 13, at art. 57. 
216  Id. 
217  See generally EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES: BEIJING, CHINA, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 
REPORT 2012, http://beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/2012tipr.html (last visited July 11, 2014). 
218  See LCL, supra note 13, at art. 57. 
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identify the proper rate of pay for workers and verify that the worker’s 
payment complies with the contracts.219 
One goal of the Amendments was to remove the cost-saving use of 
dispatch labor to evade the LCL.220  The Amendments make clear that 
dispatch employees are required to be paid the same amount as full-time 
employees doing the same work.221  This equal pay provision requires that 
workers performing the same job shall be provided not only with equal 
pay—as under Article 63 of the original LCL222—but with equal overall 
compensation, including social security payments, wages, workers’ 
compensation, and other benefits.223 
The amended law also narrows the scope of dispatch labor.  The 
Amendments contain new rules on the duration of temporary contracts.  
Under the new law, no temporary position can last more than six months.224  
The purpose of this amendment was to prevent the formation of a subset of 
the workforce perpetually trapped in temporary positions. 
The Amendments restrict the types of jobs that may be substituted to 
“auxiliary positions” and “substitute positions.”225  Auxiliary positions are 
supportive of the primary functions of the business.226  Substitute positions 
may have a stronger nexus to the main operations of the enterprise, but 
dispatch workers are only available for such positions to cover full-time 
employees on leave.227 
Further, the Amendments specified dispatch workers must not exceed 
a specified percentage of a firm’s workforce, which is determined by a labor 
arm of the State Council.228  Because the amendment was unclear, this led to 
                                         
219  Amended Labor Contract Law Targets Equal Pay, CHINA DAILY (July 1, 2013), 
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2013-07/02/content_16705182.htm (hereinafter LCL Targets Equal 
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220  See Pei Zhang, New Amendments to China Labor Contract Law Set Restrictions on the Use of 
Labor Dispatch, FROST BROWN TODD LLC (June 17, 2013), 
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228  Id. at art. 66. 
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speculation that there would either be no national percentage, or if there 
were, it would be around 30-40%.229  
The Amendments prescribed tougher penalties for violations.230  The 
fine for violations range from RMB 5,000 to RMB 10,000 per employee.231  
Article 92 of the pre-Amendments LCL provided for fines only ranging from 
RMB 1,000 to RMB 5,000.232  Under Article 92 of the Amendments, fines 
for violation of the LCL came to include revocation of a dispatch agency’s 
business license, joint and several liability between dispatch agency and 
accepting entity, and confiscation of illegal gains.233 
The Amendments did not resolve the practice of companies providing 
limited dispatch services with their own workforce and subcontracting out 
workers to other companies.234  In this way, a company could reduce 
workforce demands and minimize severance compensation by arranging for 
its contract workers to work at other companies while retaining its 
manpower.  
C. Remaining Problems with Enforcement and Misuse of Dispatch Labor 
 
Even with heftier legal penalties in place, many provisions of the LCL 
still lacked enforcement.  For example, the equal pay provision, which had 
been in legal effect since the Labor Law, did not effectively equalize 
dispatch employees.235  Abusive dispatch labor and residual ambiguity posed 
social and regulatory problems.  
In an effort to clarify some of the ambiguities left by the amendment, 
the MOHRSS issued draft provisions for public comment on August 7, 2013, 
one month after the Amendments came into effect.236  The agency accepted 
comments on the Draft Provisions until September 2013.237  
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Reactions to the Draft Provisions from business were hostile, as they 
were for the LCL and its Amendments.  Specifically, the Draft Provisions 
upset some employers by proposing a national cap of 10% dispatch workers 
in a given firm.238  Nevertheless, following the initial period of public 
comment, a version of the Draft Provisions took effect on March 1, 2014.239  
The Interim Provisions provided specificity where the Amendments 
had been silent.  For example, the Amendments had contained some residual 
ambiguity relating to the definition of “auxiliary position” and other 
terms.240  Auxiliary positions under the Interim Provisions are now defined 
on a firm-by-firm basis, but only after negotiation with either a labor union 
or employee representative.241  Also, whereas the permissible positions for 
dispatch laborers in an enterprise had been narrowed to temporary, auxiliary, 
and substitute work, the Interim Provisions specified that such positions may 
only be filled after the employees consult an “employees’ congress” and 
negotiate with the labor union or employees' representatives.242   Some 
scholars welcome the newest wave of reform, yet predict it will take many 
years for employers to adjust to the new legal regime. 243  The Interim 
Provisions demand a more ambitious rate of compliance; all firms are 
granted two years to reduce the total number of dispatch employs under the 
law’s threshold.244  
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241  Interim Provisions, supra note 239, at art. 3. 
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V. THE RIGHT TO STRIKE COULD REPLACE THE REMEDIAL INTENT OF THE 
LABOR CONTRACT LAW  
 
This comment suggests that it is doubtful that the Interim Provisions 
(which mark the most recent iteration in a long line of attempts to legislate 
workers’ rights through individual contracts) can fully achieve their 
objective. 
First, although the Labor Contract Law and its more recent 
Amendments and Interim Provisions create strong legal protections for 
workers’ rights, a problem with enforcement remains.  The 10% cap on 
dispatch workers will likely be ignored by many enterprises.  A manager 
from a dispatch agency in Shanghai recently admitted that:  
 
On average, more than half of the workers at the enterprises we 
work with are dispatched by us – in some cases the figure is 90 
percent . . . if we followed the rule that the percentage should be 
limited to 10 per cent, as some authorities are saying, my 
company would shut down within one or two years.245  
 
Secondly, precarious work and informalization of the economy are, by now, 
dominant trends that are predicted to continue. 246   Because informally 
employed workers do not benefit from workplace protections premised on 
individual labor contracts, labor standards for these workers will continue to 
deteriorate despite legislative fixes to the labor contract theory of workers’ 
rights.  A decade ago, before the LCL, Professor Wang Yi cautioned against 
China’s more general transition from “status” to “contract”:   
 
[I]n the discourse of a contractual world each and every 
relationship is rootless, starting anew, from zero.  Therefore, to 
recover a sense of social justice in China today, it is necessary 
to put aside modern notions of . . . the wage contract, and go 
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back to the origins of a collective world, when our people were 
ready to create a utopian society together.247   
 
Through the foregoing analysis of employment law reform and worker 
insurgency, it seems Professor Yi correctly foresaw the shortcomings of 
contract-based rights.  Since China’s economic reform period, “[t]he 
commodification of labour has been the constitutive process of China’s turn 
to capitalism.”248  Legislative attempts to provide rights notwithstanding, it 
appears unlikely China’s economic growth could be used to improve 
workers’ livelihood. 
Under China’s labor law regime, workers’ rights are defined narrowly 
as the right to contract as individuals. Labor laws defined this way are not so 
much labor protections as they are a method for reducing economic 
stoppages due to industrial action and an inoculation against collective rights.  
The LCL, in this sense, is a bargain struck to appease disgruntled workers 
while still maintaining a flexible labor market.249   The LCL’s protections 
were designed to curb the abuses of the system, while simultaneously 
fostering capitalist development.  
Third, a more robust system of protecting workers’ rights would be to 
eliminate the barriers to collective organizing in China.  However, that is a 
path China has not opened.  As one of ten governments characterized by the 
ILO as being “of chief economic importance,” China holds an important seat 
on the organization’s Governing Body.250  Nevertheless, China has not 
ratified four of the ILO’s eight fundamental conventions, including the two 
conventions explicitly concerned with the right to organize: Freedom of 
Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 
87) and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 
(No. 98).251  Article 2 of the ILO Convention 87 proclaims:  
Workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall 
have the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the 
                                         
247  Wang Yi, From Status to Contract?, in ONE CHINA, MANY PATHS 191 (Chaohua Wang ed., 2003). 
248  Eli Friedman & Ching Kwan Lee, Remaking the World of Chinese Labour: A 30-Year 
Retrospective, 48 BRITISH JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 507, 508, (2010). 
249  See LCL, supra note 13, at art. 1. 
250  CORNELL UNIV. LAW LIB., ILO RESEARCH GUIDE,  
http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/library/WhatWeDo/ResearchGuides/ILOguide.cfm (last revised Oct. 
2010). 
251  ILO, UP-TO-DATE CONVENTIONS NOT RATIFIED BY CHINA,  
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11210:0::NO:11210:P11210_COUNTRY_ID:103404 (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2014). 
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organisation concerned, to join organisations of their own 
choosing without previous authorisation.252  
 
Convention 98 reiterates and clarifies the right to organize.  Article 
8(1)(a) of the UN’s International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) protects: 
 
The right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade 
union of his choice, subject only to the rules of the organization 
concerned, for the promotion and protection of his economic 
and social interests.  No restrictions may be placed on the 
exercise of this right other than those necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security or public order or for 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.253 
 
In addition to the right to form and join trade unions, paragraphs two 
through three of the CESCR also protects “the right of trade unions to 
establish national federations,” “the right of trade unions to function freely,” 
and “the right to strike.”254  The ILO declares “freedom of association and 
the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining” as a 
“fundamental principle” that its members are obliged “to respect, to promote, 
and to realize. . . .”255   
According to a survey of quantitative studies of Chinese unions, union 
membership and the associated increase in democratic voices in a workplace 
has had multiple beneficial effects for workers and the economy as a 
whole.256  For example, workplaces with unions are likely to have lower 
intra-firm wage inequalities than non-unionized workplaces. 257   Union 
presence in a workplace correlates positively with employer compliance 
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with mandatory social insurance contributions.258  As the survey authors 
conclude, “workplace industrial relations institutions offer a channel for the 
collective voice of workers at the workplace – to a certain extent.”259 
China’s labor union, the ACFTU, has proven inadequate in providing 
this right and is seriously flawed as a representative of workers.260  Granted, 
there are signs the ACFTU meets its obligation to improve working 
conditions.  For example, the ACFTU’s intervention into the dispatch labor 
debate and its response to the health effects of overwork.261  Even so, the 
ACFTU is restrained by a lack of fundamental labor rights such as the right 
to organize, defined as the right held by each and every individual to form 
and join unions with colleagues, and to participate in collective 
bargaining.262 
Fourth, if the abuse of dispatch labor continues, workers left without 
formal remedies will resort to industrial action rather than legal means to 
achieve improved working conditions.  According to estimates by China 
Labor Bulletin, a Hong Kong-based NGO, the amount of strikes in China 
from July to August 2013 were double those observed for the same period 
the previous year.263  China Labor Bulletin maintains a detailed strike map, 
which illustrates the numerical prevalence of strikes in the Pearl River 
Delta.264 
Individual legal remedies are difficult to achieve for practical reasons.  
Civil suits depend on lawyers in private practice who are willing to take 
risks.  Still, some lawyers in China are pioneering a “law case intervention 
programme,” where lawyers work pro bono to take on an individual 
worker’s legal case.265  Han Dongfang, a labor activist imprisoned for 
advocating the formation of an autonomous union during the 1989 
Tiananmen Square protests, is one of the most vocal advocates for this 
method.  Because Chinese civil law provides that workers may file suit for 
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backpay, he supports lawsuits over pursuing official channels like arbitration 
and filing union grievances.266 
There are others like Han.  Zhou Litai, who gained fame and notoriety 
for representing the indigent migrant labor force, claims to have filed over 
12,000 cases on behalf of workers.267  For years Zhou took on the cases 
under a contingency fee agreement, receiving nothing for cases that he 
lost.268  Zhou even provided free room and board to hundreds of injured 
workers whom he represented.269  The model is reminiscent of early labor 
hall tactics among American unions. 
Legal casework of this sort is no guarantee of a remedy, however, and 
organizing clandestinely is even riskier.  Despite the official discouragement 
of independent labor unions, and the criminalization of autonomous worker 
actions, unauthorized wildcat strikes (i.e., strikes not authorized by the 
union) have proliferated in China.  In June 2010, for example, Honda factory 
workers in Foshan, Guandong Province, led several extended walkouts to 
demand an end to unsafe working conditions, wage arrears, and lack of 
collective bargaining power.270  Then, in December of 2011, an estimated 
8,000 employees of Korea-based electronics manufacturer LG, striked in 
Nanjing, Jiangsu province to protest low wages.271  
The Supreme People’s Court, noting the surge in labor unrest 
following the passage of the Labor Contract Law, suggested that the fault lay 
with employers.272  According to Sun Jungong, “[s]ome enterprises tend to 
ignore the protection of workers’ rights in order to maximize profits and 
minimize labor costs, with illegal unemployment and violations of 
employees’ legitimate rights being common.” 273   The agitation among 
workers may be tied to the LCL in more than one way.  First, the Labor 
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Contract Law may have been successful in raising workers’ awareness of 
their legal rights.  Second, the laws may have created more protections with 
which employers are not prepared to comply.  In conjunction with this, the 
lack of enforcement built into the laws has left workers with legal wrongs 
without formal remedies.274 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
According to Ke Chen, the emphasis of labor contract reform as the 
basis for promoting labor standards in China is rooted in a balancing act 
between providing a flexible labor market that preserves employers’ right to 
meet their personnel needs, and safeguarding the employees’ right to work 
and rights at work.275  It is a mediated policy, seeking the benefits of the 
former system where the state was responsible for workers’ livelihoods, and 
the benefits of a dynamic economy that can take advantage of a fluid labor 
market. 
Through several iterations of amendment, clarification, and 
refinement through multiple levels of government, China sought to close the 
loopholes opened by the attempt to provide workers’ rights through 
individual contract.  Meanwhile, the reforms made no meaningful 
contribution toward collective rights.  Considering the statistical expansion 
of informal work, the regulatory problems posed by the labor dispatch 
industry, the lack of enforcement of existing remedial legislation, and the 
lack of collective rights, it remains unclear whether China can have it both 
ways through its balancing act between socialism and capitalism. 
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